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Executive summary
•  The Arctic environment is facing rapid changes as 
temperatures there are rising twice as fast as the global 
average. Trees and shrubs are spreading northward, the 
ice-free season is lengthening, and sea ice is rapidly 
diminishing in extent. These changes have strong effects on 
biodiversity and local communities, but also wide-ranging 
effects via feedbacks to climate change, sea-level rise, and 
therefore the future of societies globally.
•  Understanding and predicting climate change in the Arctic, 
both from a local and global perspective, was the focus of 
the NERC Arctic Research Programme (ARP) which ran from 
2011 to 2016. Key topics included the degree to which 
current effects of climate change reinforce or mitigate future 
change, and the identification of critical processes 
contributing to such changes, now and in the future. 
Researchers covered many Arctic habitats, including oceans, 
lakes, wetlands, tundra and forest.
•  Research identified processes that both reinforce climate 
change and have neutral effects but very few mitigating 
processes. This suggests that many changes are likely to 
increase in rate and severity. Permafrost thaw and increasing 
temperatures are highly likely to increase greenhouse gas 
emissions, and coastal areas are increasingly suffering from 
erosion and sea-level rise. Ocean warming and the melting of 
sea ice are being reinforced by increased ice-free surface 
area which absorbs more warmth and also allows winds to 
stir warm water to the surface. Increased cloudiness traps 
warmth above sea ice and reinforces ice melt.
•  Arctic Ocean currents are accelerating and ocean mixing 
“hot-spots” can bring ocean heat up to the surface from 
below. There are logical, but speculative, consequences of 
these two findings: accelerated and seasonally-extended 
sea-ice decline, and increases in mid-latitude (including the 
UK) extreme weather events.
•  Increased freshwater flows into the Arctic and northern North 
Atlantic may weaken the current system (the “overturning 
circulation”, of which the Gulf Stream is part) that brings 
ocean heat to northern European latitudes. The impact of 
global warming may be regionally reduced, with uncertain 
consequences for UK weather and climate.
•  Increased commercial shipping activity due to diminishing 
sea ice will require improved short-term shipping forecasts 
that take into account changing ocean currents, seasons,  
and weather patterns, in order to minimise risk. Similar 
considerations are required for off-shore drilling ventures.
•  Risk of methane release from the ocean is not deemed high, 
as most methane becomes processed into CO2 before 
reaching the atmosphere. Methane hydrates, the form 
methane takes when trapped under water, are also unlikely to 
cause under-sea landslides. The largest source of greenhouse 
gases in the Arctic, and that most likely to increase in the 
future, comes from land, specifically wetlands, as well as 
from shelf regions due to submerged, thawing permafrost 
and coastal erosion. 
•  Future UK Arctic policy will benefit from improving 
communication and collaboration between scientists and 
policymakers, and also from further (targeted) investment in 
research. Researchers’ suggestions include increased 
cooperation among national funding agencies and support of 
international collaborative efforts where science needs them. 
Archiving, digitising and disseminating existing data is a 
further cost-effective means of increasing Government 
investment in research. Given the novel investment 
opportunities in the Arctic, research is also needed in order to 
reduce uncertainty about the environmental and economic 
future of the region. Finally, cross-disciplinary work that 
involves social-science approaches is needed to place 
observed changes and future projections in a human context.
•  The Arctic offers a unique opportunity to increase 
collaboration between scientists and policymakers, as 
science lies at the core of the UK’s Arctic policy framework. 
Beyond providing a better understanding of the rapid 
changes in the Arctic, science can support the building of 
bridges and networks of collaborations to underpin the 
diplomatic relations between the UK and the Arctic states.
•  Research Councils, the NERC Arctic Office and international 
Arctic fora have a crucial role to play in facilitating the 
dialogue between scientists and decision-makers. Similarly, 
the complexity of the Arctic requires forums to discuss issues 
across the worlds of NGOs, science, business and politics.
•  This policy report is an example of a concrete initiative to 
engage with the Arctic policy community and discuss the 
Arctic climate research carried out in the NERC ARP. Similar 
initiatives, under the auspices of the Research Councils and 
the Government, could continue supporting the dialogue 
between Arctic science and policy.
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Introduction
The Arctic is one of the most rapidly changing regions of the 
world: temperatures here are rising twice as fast as the global 
average, and ice cover on land and sea is rapidly diminishing.
HM Government’s 2013 policy framework “Adapting to Change 
– UK policy towards the Arctic” recognised that the 
consequences of changes in the Arctic extend far beyond the 
Arctic region and cover a broad span of the UK’s interests: 
societal, economic and environmental. The document also 
highlighted the need to devise responsible policy with full 
regard to the environment. UK-based Arctic science was 
identified as having a unique role in contributing to policy, 
reputation and influence.
The Arctic Research Programme (ARP), funded by the Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC) ran from 2011 to 2016, 
and made £15 million available for research into changes in 
the Arctic and their possible future consequences worldwide.
This report reviews the findings of the projects funded by the 
NERC ARP and highlights those conclusions that might have 
implications for the future direction of UK Government policy 
over the next decades. The potential implications are not 
limited to changes in the Arctic alone but will affect broader 
regions, thus requiring the international engagement of the UK 
in regional strategies. Where the NERC ARP projects have 
contributed to a better understanding of impacts affecting the 
UK specifically, for example changing weather patterns or 
tsunamis generated by landslides in northern seas, they will be 
of interest to policymakers engaged in a wide range of 
domestic policy areas as well.
The Arctic remains one of the least well understood regions of 
the world for reasons of accessibility and environmental 
complexity. Many uncertainties still exist, and further work is 
required to address these (Box 1). While we here give an 
indication of where such uncertainties remain, we primarily 
highlight conclusions that can now be drawn about likely and 
possible future scenarios that concern the local evolution of 
the Arctic environment and (where appropriate) non-local 
consequences. This will enable consideration to be given to 
taking advantage of emerging opportunities as well as to 
possible adaptation or mitigation measures required to address 
future challenges.
Many links already exist between policymakers and their 
scientific advisers on the one hand and those involved in 
research on the other. Drawing on the experiences of the 
NERC ARP projects, this report also considers how even closer 
engagement between policymakers and researchers might be 
achieved in the future, so that their respective interests and 
needs are well understood at an early stage in the research 
cycle.
 
Fig. 1: a: Land cover of the Arctic and Subarctic (polar projection). Key: Dark green = forest; light green = forest-tundra (transitional); pink = tundra.  
b: Topographic and bathymetric map of the Arctic and Subarctic (polar projection) Pinterest URL: https://www.pinterest.co.uk/pin/298363544038348263/.  
c: The Northern Circumpolar Soil Organic Carbon Database version 2. Bolin Centre for Climate Research, Stockholm University. URL: http://bolin.su.se/data/ncscd/
a b c
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Geographical areas covered by the report
“The Arctic” is hard to define in simple terms without resort to 
technical language and even scientists sometimes avoid giving 
an exact definition because of its complexity (Box 1). A climate 
scientist might say that the Arctic comprises the ocean and 
atmosphere north of their respective Polar Fronts, but on land, 
many criteria are possible: for example, north of the tree-line, 
the area occupied by tundra (or by permafrost), or the Arctic-
Ocean-draining river catchments.
While no criterion can be as well expressed as latitude (Fig. 2), 
other criteria are useful. “The northern cryosphere” is a 
functional definition, where “cryosphere” is taken to mean the 
high latitudes which are permanently frozen or where the 
freeze-thaw cycle is important at the land and ocean surface. 
In this report, we employ the broadest and most inclusive 
meaning of “the northern cryosphere”: where NERC ARP 
research was conducted and where processes and predictions 
identified by the scientists leading the projects apply.
There are eight Arctic States: Canada, the Kingdom of 
Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These 
States form the Members of the Arctic Council, an 
intergovernmental forum. The UK is an Observer to the Arctic 
Council and is also the most northerly country outside the 
eight Members.
BOX 1: A vast and complex Arctic
The treeless Arctic alone covers 11 million km2, an area slightly larger than Europe1. With the looser definition adopted in this 
report that includes forested areas within the Arctic Circle as well as the Subarctic (the region immediately south of the 
Arctic Circle), the area is even larger and more complex. It encompasses many gradients, extending from sea level to almost 
4000m1, from polar desert to wet tundra to forest, and from areas of permanent snow to those with dense vegetation and 
high seasonal plant growth. Understanding how the region is responding to current and future change is a challenge. 
Variation in the environment not only occurs across large expanses but also at small scales, for example, strong differences 
can exist between north and south-facing hillslopes. Furthermore, although considerable research has been devoted to 
understanding the Arctic, large information gaps remain, particularly in more inaccessible areas. The data available to 
researchers are sparse in space and time, and thus predicting spatial and temporal change is inherently challenging. Putting 
numbers on landscape-scale processes, such as sea-ice changes and greenhouse gas emissions, is of primary interest to 
both researchers and policymakers.
Example of complexity and uncertainty - Will thawing permafrost increase or decrease carbon dioxide emissions in 
streams and lakes? “Browning” is a term used to describe effects on streams and lakes whereby increasing temperatures 
thaw frozen soil and release more tea-coloured dissolved carbon into the water. This carbon may be easily converted to 
greenhouse gases, contributing positively to climate change. While browning has been widely reported in lower latitudes, 
patterns appear inconsistent in the Arctic2. Researchers have found that in some areas, instead of causing browning, 
thawing soils expose minerals that absorb carbon. The locations where each of the processes dominates over the other 
cannot be predicted at present; however researchers suspect that the history of the landscape may be key. For example, if 
thick organic soils have developed over thousands of years, more browning is likely compared to areas where the organic 
soil layer is thin. 
Fig. 2: Various definitions of the Arctic1
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Key findings of the NERC  
Arctic Research Programme
The Programme set out to address four scientific questions. Below, we summarise the main findings of each strand, 
emphasising new risks and opportunities arising with regard to our understanding of climate change processes and 
projections, and impacts on UK interests.
Question 1: What is causing the rapid changes  
in the Arctic at the moment?
Key points:
•  The decline of sea ice allows more of the particles that 
generate clouds (“cloud condensation nuclei”) to be 
released into the atmosphere. Low-level clouds insulate the 
near-surface atmosphere, thereby increasing surface 
warming, particularly in the autumn, when sea-ice 
concentration is lowest. This therefore is a positive 
feedback: more open water leads to more clouds, which in 
turn leads to more warming and more open water.
•  Several mechanisms are expected to increase the input of 
fresh water into the Arctic Ocean. Transmission of 
freshened seawater into the northern North Atlantic could 
slow the large-scale ocean circulation that brings ocean 
heat via the Gulf Stream system into the North Atlantic. In 
the context of global warming it is however possible that 
regionally (meaning north-west Europe, including the UK) 
warming could slow as a consequence of the change in 
ocean circulation.
•  The decline of sea ice is causing Arctic Ocean currents to 
accelerate, which in turn will lead to stronger turbulent 
ocean mixing. Stronger ocean mixing can bring heat up to 
the surface from below. This could cause further ice melt 
and local (Arctic) atmospheric warming, which in turn may 
change mid-latitude (including UK) weather and extremes.
•  New shipping routes will open as a result of the reduction in 
arctic sea-ice cover and after 2050, very little sea ice will be 
left in summer. While the NERC ARP projections represent 
trends in sea-ice cover in an average year, variability from 
year to year is likely to be significant, so reliable forecasts for 
each season will be needed to allow operators to plan ahead.
•  Shipping in the Arctic is unlikely to contribute significant 
amounts of black carbon when compared with 
atmospheric transport from sources such as vehicles and 
industry elsewhere in the world. Therefore, regulation of 
the Arctic shipping industry is likely to be an insufficient 
control on the warming effect of black carbon deposition.
The Arctic climate is governed by complex interactions between 
atmosphere, ocean, sea ice and land areas. Some may 
involve feedbacks, when changes in one part of the system 
reinforce (or mitigate) changes in another. One of the best 
known examples of reinforcement is the so-called ice-albedo 
feedback. Here, the melting of sea ice leads to a greater 
extent of open water, which absorbs more heat from the sun 
than ice because it is less reflective. The extra heat in turn 
warms the ocean, leading to still more ice melt. The ice-
albedo feedback contributes to the doubling of the global 
rate of warming in the Arctic, known as “Arctic amplification”.
Clouds and climate
The largest single uncertainty in modelling the Arctic climate is 
a poor understanding of clouds and the processes that lead to 
their formation. The effect that clouds have on climate is 
complex and depends on several factors, including their 
thickness and altitude in the atmosphere. Thick clouds in the 
lower atmosphere help to keep the Earth’s surface cool by 
reflecting away solar radiation that would otherwise cause 
surface warming. In the Arctic, however, this cooling effect is 
less important in areas where sea ice remains, because the ice 
is itself reflective (Box 2) and it is outweighed by the clouds’ 
role as an insulating blanket, holding in heat at the surface and 
preventing it from being radiated away into space.
In order to form, a cloud needs both a source of water vapour 
and a source of liquid droplets or particles on which the water 
vapour can condense. It has been suggested that a feedback 
mechanism might exist: more open water results from 
increased sea-ice melt. This allows more particles to move 
from the ocean into the atmosphere, where they can generate 
clouds, hence causing increased surface warming.
NERC ARP researchers investigated the conditions that lead to 
cloud formation using specialist research aircraft and ships. In 
coastal areas, they discovered evidence of iodine particles, 
which can contribute to cloud formation, and it is suspected 
that these come from seaweed, which is able to grow where 
sea ice has broken up2. This might also be an important 
feedback mechanism.
Implications for policy and decision makers from the NERC Arctic Research Programme 2011-16
5
In another study, researchers developed a computer model to 
look at whether increased amounts of sea-salt and dimethyl 
sulphide (a chemical released by algae) projected into the 
atmosphere from the newly exposed ocean might increase 
cloud formation. They found that the concentration of 
particles was not as great as expected, perhaps because they 
are removed from the atmosphere by rain3.
The insights that the researchers have gained from their 
measurements have contributed to a better representation of 
clouds and their formation in climate models. At the time of 
writing, analysis of new predictions from the models is 
continuing.
BOX 2: Black carbon in the Arctic
One potential source of Arctic warming is black carbon, or soot particles. If these settle on the surface of ice, they absorb 
more of the sun’s energy than the ice alone because they are darker and less reflective. Researchers investigated whether 
deposition of black carbon generated by increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic (Box 3) might contribute to faster ice melt. 
They concluded that shipping in the Arctic was unlikely to contribute significant amounts of black carbon when compared 
with atmospheric transport from sources such as vehicles and industry elsewhere in the world. Therefore, regulation of the 
Arctic shipping industry was likely to be an insufficient control on the warming effect of black carbon deposition3,4.
The effect of melting sea ice  
on the ocean and atmosphere 
The progressive loss of Arctic sea ice 
through the 21st century (Fig. 3) is likely to 
have consequences both for local (Arctic) 
and remote (mid-latitude, including the UK) 
weather and climate. This, in turn, will 
influence international investment in new 
Arctic shipping routes (Box 3).
Weakening of overturning  
Ocean circulation
Considering climate first, there is a well- 
recognised mechanism, called the Atlantic 
Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) 
that is responsible for the UK’s mild climate. 
The AMOC brings warm ocean surface water 
northwards through what is commonly 
known (in the North Atlantic) as the “Gulf 
Stream System”. Westerly winds blow 
across this warm water and pull heat from  
it, so the system acts like a “fan-assisted 
storage heater”. When this warm Atlantic seawater reaches 
much higher northern latitudes, it becomes much colder and 
denser, so it sinks and returns southwards at great depth – 
hence “overturning circulation”.
The AMOC possesses an Achilles heel, however. If the Atlantic 
waters are capped by a layer of lighter, fresher water, the loss 
of heat to the atmosphere can be inhibited, so the overturning 
circulation slows, and the delivery of ocean heat to our 
latitudes is slowed. There are a number of ways in which this 
cap of fresher seawater could appear: sea ice melting, 
increased river runoff into the Arctic Ocean, release of fresher 
seawater presently held in the Arctic Ocean, and also by 
increased melting of the Greenland ice cap. In the context of 
global warming, it is possible that regionally (meaning north-
west Europe, including the UK) warming could slow.
Faster sea-ice decline
In the Arctic Ocean, the vertical pattern of water temperature is 
unusual. Warm, salty water flows into the Arctic from the Atlantic 
Ocean. In the Arctic Ocean, this Atlantic seawater lies mostly 
about 200 metres below the surface because it is denser than the 
layer of cold, fresher Arctic-sourced seawater that covers it like a 
lid. While the warm water is isolated from the surface in this way, 
the heat that it contains cannot contribute to melting of the 
sea ice at the surface. However, if the boundary between cold 
and warm water is disturbed for any reason, the rate of sea-ice 
loss might increase. This process of “disturbance” in the ocean 
is called turbulent mixing and it causes stirring together of 
adjacent layers of seawater. If the cold waters near the surface 
can mix with the deeper, warmer seawater, then the resulting 
mixture of the two will have a temperature between the two. 
As a result, temperatures near the surface would increase. 
In an important series of field expeditions, UK researchers 
measured turbulent mixing rates all around the Arctic Ocean: 
some measurements were over the continental slope under 
sea ice, others were over the continental slope in open water, 
and still more in the deep ocean. They found that the strength 
of the mixing was much greater over the continental slope 
than in the central Arctic, and they suggest it is caused (at 
present) by tidal currents passing over the rough sea floor4 
 
Fig. 3: Sea-ice decline from the 1970s to recent years. The line traces ice volume through time (greatest 
Mar-May; least Aug-Oct). The most recent years (yellow) show diminishing values compared with the 1980s 
URL: https://www.climate-lab-book.ac.uk/spirals/
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(akin to the atmospheric turbulence generated when winds 
blow over mountains, a phenomenon routinely experienced 
by air travellers). This generates localised “hot-spots” of surface 
heating from below by mixing upwards some of the heat 
contained in the deep-lying Atlantic-sourced seawater.
Now for this turbulent mixing process to affect the rate of 
sea-ice decline, it would need to become much more 
geographically widespread, around the Arctic Ocean. At 
present, the mixing is driven by tidal currents, but they will not 
change in the future. However, it is possible that the Arctic 
Ocean circulation itself - the system of currents that controls 
the horizontal movement of seawater around the Arctic - will 
change. At present, the Arctic Ocean circulation is notably 
sluggish, with currents typically 2 cm/s, compared with the rest 
of the world ocean, where currents are over ten times faster. 
Slow currents mean that mixing rates are presently weak, 
excepting the “hot-spots”, where fast but local tides provide 
strong currents to generate turbulence. So the question is: 
might the Arctic Ocean currents accelerate in the future?
UK scientists have found that the answer to this question is yes, 
and Arctic Ocean currents are actually accelerating now. Satellite 
observations show that in the Canada Basin, in a wind-driven 
circulation pattern called the Beaufort Gyre5, currents have 
doubled or trebled in speed because broken-up (or 
“unconsolidated”) sea-ice floes transfer the force of the wind to 
the ocean more efficiently than the fully ice-covered ocean 
surface can do. This process of acceleration of ocean currents 
is called “spin-up” and scientists expect the Arctic Ocean 
currents to spin up more in coming years as a result of the 
action of the wind on greater areas of wholly or partially 
ice-free water. With stronger currents comes more vigorous 
mixing, which can transfer more heat from the deep warm 
layer to the surface. This may cause the presently localised 
hot-spots to expand all around the Arctic.
This may have significant consequences for the rate of decline 
of sea ice, because increased turbulent mixing can bring heat 
up to the surface all year round, so that the melt season would 
no longer depend solely on the spring-time arrival of heat from 
the sun. The melt season would extend forwards into early 
spring and late winter, and back into late autumn and early 
winter. An extreme possibility is that zero sea ice – confidently 
predicted to happen in late summer later this century – might 
ultimately happen all year round.
BOX 3: New shipping routes open up 
A reduction in summer ice cover in the 
Arctic Ocean could open the door to new 
shipping routes between Europe and Asia, 
saving time and fuel and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and pollutants 
(Fig. 4). NERC ARP researchers have 
modelled changes in accessibility and likely 
transit times along different routes across 
the Arctic Ocean over the next century. 
Transit will always be easiest in September, 
when ice cover is at a minimum, but to 
become viable, Arctic routes will need to be 
open for a longer season. The researchers 
conclude that after 2050, very little sea ice 
will be left in summer and the route via the 
North Pole should be accessible even by  
ships with minimal ice strengthening. The 
journey time between Europe and Asia on  
this route is projected to be about 10 days  
shorter than the route via the Suez Canal.
While these projections represent trends in sea ice cover in an average year, variability from year to year is likely to be 
significant, so reliable forecasts for each season will be needed to allow operators to plan ahead. Ships will also need access 
to short term forecasts of weather conditions such as fog to complete their journeys safely. The insights from the NERC 
ARP studies should help operators to make a rounded appraisal of the potential benefits of Arctic shipping routes, alongside 
factors such as relative fuel costs and the additional costs of ice-strengthened vessels and ice-breaker escorts if required5.
Mid-latitude weather and extremes
It is already known that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as 
the rest of the world through “Arctic amplification” (see key 
points). Research over the last few years6 is beginning to show 
how Arctic amplification is affecting weather and extremes 
outside the Arctic, in the northern hemisphere mid-latitudes, 
including the UK. Faster Arctic warming means that the surface 
temperature difference between the Arctic and mid-latitudes is 
slowly decreasing. This decreasing temperature difference 
impacts mid-latitude weather, by causing weather systems 
(depressions) to move more slowly across the Atlantic and 
even to make them prone to “stalling”. In parallel, continental 
high pressure systems are harder to push away. The outcome 
is more persistent spells of extreme weather, including floods, 
snowfall, heatwaves, droughts and poor air quality – and these 
phenomena have been seen variously in recent years in e.g. 
the US, UK and China.
In summary, scientists found during NERC’s Arctic Research 
Programme (i) that Arctic Ocean currents are accelerating and 
also (ii) that mixing “hot-spots” can bring ocean heat up to the 
surface from below. We have described logical, but necessarily 
speculative, consequences of these two findings: accelerated 
and seasonally-extended sea-ice decline and increases in 
extreme mid-latitude weather events. While speculative, these 
potential consequences provide powerful motivation for future 
research directions.
 
Fig. 4: Model outputs for 2010–2019 and 2030–2039 sea ice concentration (%, shades of blue) 
and thickness (labeled contours) during the navigation period (June–October). The Arctic shipping 
routes are shown schematically: the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (dashed arrow), the North Pole 
Route (NPR) (dark-grey arrow) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) and Arctic Bridge (AB) (light-grey 
arrow). (Image credit: Yevgeny Aksenov)
2010–2019 2030–2039
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Question 2: What are the processes influencing the release of 
greenhouse gases such as methane and carbon dioxide – and 
how much of these gases could enter the atmosphere in future?
Key points:
•  A huge reserve for potential greenhouse gas emissions 
exists in the Arctic in the form of permafrost soils, peat, lake 
sediments and vegetation. If all Arctic permafrost thawed, 
exposing previously frozen carbon to decomposition, 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations could double according 
to some estimates8.
•  Even with partial permafrost thaw, there is a risk of climate 
change accelerating due to increased release of 
greenhouse gases from Arctic and Subarctic areas that are 
becoming warmer, moister and more densely vegetated.
•  There is a risk of positive feedbacks to climate change due 
to increasing greenhouse gas emissions in shelf regions, 
where carbon-processing hotspots are created by increases 
in carbon supply from thawing permafrost under the sea 
and coastal erosion enhanced by current climate change.
•  The High Arctic is likely to be an exception to the expected 
self-reinforcing nature of climate change in the Arctic, 
having an increased likelihood of future CO2 and methane 
uptake with warming.
•  The risk of increase in atmospheric greenhouse gases due 
to the release of methane from deep-sea methane hydrates 
is assessed as small.
•  Beyond the trends observed in NERC ARP projects, 
uncertainty exists about the quantities of greenhouse gas 
emitted now and in the future, owing to landscape 
complexity and scarcity of observational data.
Currently, the Arctic is a methane source, emitting more CH4 
than it takes up. According to some estimates, high latitudes 
contribute approximately 12% of global methane emissions, 
the highest sources still being tropical wetlands and 
ruminants7. However, there is still uncertainty about how 
much methane the Arctic emits or will emit, owing to 
landscape complexity and scarcity of observational data. 
Importantly, we know even less of carbon dioxide - we 
cannot even be certain of whether or not the Arctic is a 
carbon dioxide sink or source. A huge carbon reserve for 
potential greenhouse gas emissions exists in form of 
permafrost, peat, lake sediments and vegetation. 
The land 
Climate change is resulting in many changes in the Arctic. 
These include a northward advance of trees into areas 
currently under shrub tundra and the advance of shrub tundra 
into areas with currently low-growing tundra vegetation, a 
process called “greening”. Other changes include the thawing 
of permafrost and increasing precipitation, especially in 
autumn9. All these processes impact the function of 
greenhouse gas “sinks” and “sources”, i.e. areas that on balance 
either take up or emit greenhouse gases. It is currently 
uncertain how much these changes will affect the overall 
status of greenhouse gases in the Arctic (Box 1 & 4). One of 
the main uncertainties to date has been what effect thawing 
permafrost is having and will have on the Arctic and thence 
the global carbon cycle10. Increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions from wetlands are expected, but they may be offset 
by carbon dioxide (CO2) uptake by larger and more rapidly 
growing plants.
 
Fig. 5: Areas with ice wedge polygons may become drier with climate change as ice melts and channels between hummocks drain; in this photograph, from the 
Mackenzie Uplands between Inuvik and Tuktoyaktuk (Northwest Territories, Canada) drainage and drying of polygons is evident, as well as shrub encroachment, 
especially on polygon margins (photo credit: Philip Wookey)
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Several NERC ARP projects focused on improving our 
understanding of carbon processes and feedbacks. Disconcertingly, 
evidence points towards self-reinforcing climate change:
Rainfall is predicted to increase with climate change. It 
enhances thawing of permafrost because it decreases the 
insulation capacity of the soil regardless of the nature of the 
dominant vegetation (e.g. forest, tundra)11. Thawing permafrost 
activates carbon stored in the soil for centuries or millennia. 
This carbon becomes processed by microbes into greenhouse 
gases, again becoming a positive climate change feedback.
Greening in the form of northward spread of birch and willow 
shrubs surprised researchers by its release of CO2 from soil 
carbon stocks, offsetting the carbon uptake by the shrubs 
themselves. It is suspected that the magnitude of CO2 release 
vs. capture depends on the history of the soil—how much soil 
and carbon has accumulated over millennia—and therefore on 
how much excess carbon is decomposed by soil microbes.
Hydrology is key in predicting the balance between CO2 and 
methane (CH4) emissions (Box 4). However, hydrological 
change itself is difficult to predict. In some areas, thawing 
permafrost has resulted in the formation of new pools and 
lakes, whereas in others lakes and pools have emptied and left 
the landscape dry12,13 (Fig. 5).
“Wetting” is most likely to occur in lowland depressions and 
coastal areas where rising sea levels are causing water tables 
to rise. In more complex landscapes, both wetting and drying 
may occur. Methane release in wetting areas will, in terms of 
greenhouse gas forcing, offset CO2 uptake in drying areas. It is 
probable that Arctic methane contributions will increase in the 
future and therefore be a positive feedback to climate change.
These conclusions are supported by many in the international 
research community, who have jointly emphasised that 
warming-related greenhouse gas emissions may offset the 
uptake of these gases by greening14.
Arctic lakes and carbon
Lakes cover almost 6% of the land surface of the Arctic, a high 
proportion compared with most latitudes15, and they have 
more intensive carbon cycling than most land areas. One 
NERC ARP project specifically focused on lakes, with the aim 
of understanding how their ecology and productivity changed 
with climate warming since the end of the last ice age. In 
ecology, productivity refers to the growth and reproduction of 
biomass in an ecosystem (e.g. plants such as algae). All else 
being equal, increases in productivity generally make lakes 
more likely to act as greenhouse-gas sinks, i.e. they use more 
carbon than they release. Based on the properties of lake 
sediments and associated fossils (Box 5), it appears that, just as 
on land, warming leads to increased plant growth within the 
lake and at the water’s edge (Fig. 6).
The productivity of lake plants, including algae, is also 
controlled by the vegetation surrounding the lake. The spread 
of conifer forest and presence of deep, carbon-rich soils can 
decrease productivity, while, on the other hand, spread of 
alder, a shrub that leaks nitrogen into waterways, fertilizes lakes, 
thus increasing productivity. As on land, we observe 
contrasting processes and it is their balance that will determine 
whether lakes will increase their net release of greenhouse 
gases with further warming. In modern studies, researchers 
have shown most Arctic lakes to be greenhouse gas sources.  
It is therefore a key question whether increases in productivity 
can offset the extra carbon now being released into aquatic 
systems in the Arctic.
 
Fig. 6: A lake in Sisimiut, SW Greenland, in a typical landscape for the area 
(photo credit: Madeline Giles)
BOX 4: Methane vs carbon dioxide
The two main greenhouse gases emitted in the Arctic, carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4), tend to be produced under 
different circumstances. In terms of greenhouse gas forcing of temperature, CH4 is approximately 30 times stronger than 
CO2. As the Arctic climate changes, will more or less greenhouse forcing occur as a function of the changing balances 
between production and uptake of CH4 and CO2?
Carbon processing in many landscapes is dominated by photosynthesis, by which plants take up CO2 from the atmosphere, 
and by respiration (including decomposition), which releases CO2. Carbon dioxide is produced by all respiring organisms when 
oxygen is present. Interestingly, new research in Greenland has found these processes to be balanced - warm years lead to 
similar increases in both photosynthesis and respiration unless disturbances such as pest outbreaks destroy vegetation.
Methane, on the other hand, is produced under circumstances in which oxygen is severely restricted or lacking, such as 
underwater locations, which can include areas close to ocean floors where currents are slow, sediments of lakes and 
ponds, and waterlogged soil. Methane production, like CO2 production, also increases with warming. Therefore, in areas 
that become wetter and warmer, CH4 production will increase in the future, and offset the potential reduction in CO2.
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Arctic research has tended to focus on carbon-rich areas of 
the Low Arctic. The High Arctic, in contrast, has carbon-poor 
soils and low productivity, because of the low temperatures 
and low precipitation and because water is frozen most of the 
year. Overall, less carbon is buried in high-arctic lake sediments 
than in low-arctic lakes and little, if any, is released as 
greenhouse gases16. Carbon-poor areas are expected to 
become CH4 and CO2 sinks as temperatures increase and soils 
develop. Consequently, the High Arctic and its lakes have the 
potential to remain a greenhouse gas sink as a result of future 
warming17.
Climate change effects on lakes will also have repercussions 
on local communities. Increasingly early ice-out on lakes 
across the Arctic, revealed by satellite data analysis, impacts 
the use of frozen lakes and wetlands as winter transport routes. 
Users of such routes need to be aware of this in order to avoid 
accidents and accommodate seasonal trends when planning 
both transport logistics and new roads.
The oceans
Ocean warming has led to fears that methane might be released 
through the collapse of methane hydrate, which is a crystalline 
form of methane that occurs in the seabed below the deep 
ocean under conditions of low temperature and high pressure. 
NERC ARP researchers investigated whether methane released 
from hydrate might make its way to the atmosphere and 
contribute to global warming now and in the future.
Researchers examined data collected west of Svalbard, an area 
chosen because warming waters flowing in from the Atlantic 
meet the seafloor there, making the release of methane more 
likely than in other Arctic regions. They found signs of methane 
release but observed that nearly all of the gas was transformed 
into carbon dioxide and dissolved in the seawater before it 
could be released to the atmosphere18. Such dissolution will 
contribute to ocean acidification, but the effect is small.
After analysing the measurements taken on site and running 
computer models, the researchers concluded that the 
contribution to the carbon dioxide content of seawater from 
the steady breakdown of hydrates is likely to be less than 1% of 
the ocean uptake of carbon from anthropogenic sources over 
the 21st century19. Further, new estimates of atmospheric 
methane sources indicate that only ca 1% of global methane 
emissions result from hydrates20.
A different situation occurs in shelf regions such as the East 
Siberian Arctic Shelf (ESAS), where the ocean abuts large land 
masses. Here, new findings suggest an important role for 
greenhouse gas contributions from shelf areas. On the ESAS, the 
water is shallower and carbon is received from rivers, streams and 
eroding land. Furthermore, vast amounts of submerged permafrost 
are stored within shelves, which can thaw, with considerable 
release of methane21. The coastal erosion is of particular importance. 
ESAS is already under stress due to combined effects of climate 
change: increasing wave action, rising sea levels and the sinking 
of land as permafrost thaws — all consequences of warming —
together result in ever increasing coastal erosion rates22 (see 
cover image). ARP research shows the process of coastal erosion 
potentially transports more carbon to the East Siberian Shelf than 
all rivers in this area combined, much more than previously 
thought. All of these processes create potential hotspots for 
greenhouse gas emissions. Much of the carbon can be, and has 
been, converted to CO2. It has already resulted in acidification 
in excess of levels projected in this region for 210023.
BOX 5: Dating sediments: 
palaeolimnology
Sediments from lake bottoms can be sliced 
and dated using radioactive forms of carbon 
(radiocarbon dating). Multiple analyses can be 
undertaken on the slices to reconstruct the 
history of a lake. Combined, these analyses 
give us information of past temperatures, 
precipitation, carbon accumulation, and the 
biology of both aquatic and terrestrial 
environments.
The information helps us understand how 
climate change in the past has influenced 
biodiversity, greenhouse gas emissions, and 
the landscape. 
This information provides baselines and 
conditions for comparison and describes 
previous responses to change, all of which can 
inform current understanding and projections 
of future change.
 
Fig. 7: A sediment core being retrieved from a lake in Greenland (photo credit: Mark Stevenson)
The rapidly changing Arctic environment
10
Key points:
•  Satellite data are becoming increasingly important in helping 
scientists acquire enough data to construct predictive models. 
Researchers found that most of the variation in the capacity 
of ecosystems in the Arctic to act as CO2 sinks could be 
predicted using simple and available measures such as light 
available to plants, air temperature and the way vegetation 
reflects radiation. This means that rough predictions of 
productivity can be made despite spatial variation in vegetation.
•  Technical improvements have also been made in using 
available data. Greenhouse gas estimates for remote and 
inaccessible areas could improve in the near future.
•  Improvements in the models have also enabled researchers 
to identify the sources of methane-rich air masses. Tracing 
sources of methane will be invaluable in improving 
greenhouse gas source maps as well as predicting future 
emission hotspots.
•  The predictions of Arctic sea ice cover that underpin global 
climate models encompass the entire area of the Arctic 
Ocean. Less effort has hitherto been put into developing 
models which can produce the detailed regional forecasts 
that will be of most use for shipping and for indigenous 
populations. NERC ARP researchers have found that predicting 
sea ice is most difficult in areas closest to the coast, which 
is where the forecasts are likely to be of most value.
•  There is still scope to improve model predictions of Arctic 
climate and sea ice cover, but some technical challenges 
remain to be addressed. Better observations of sea ice and 
more observations in the terrestrial Arctic (both in time and 
space) are required. At the same time, traditional on-
location and long-term monitoring remains an important 
basis for predictive models (Fig. 8).
Accurate predictions of the future Arctic climate over different 
timescales are valuable for a number of reasons. Longer-term 
predictions allow policymakers in the Arctic and indigenous 
groups to plan for future change, but, given the influence of 
the Arctic on the atmosphere and oceans in the rest of the 
world, they are also important in informing predictions of 
global climate. As Arctic sea ice cover diminishes, shorter-
term forecasts looking a few weeks or months ahead will 
allow shipping companies to make informed decisions about 
likely access to shipping routes, for example.
Question 3: How can we improve our predictions of what 
will happen to the climate in the Arctic and the amounts of 
greenhouse gases released in the future?
 
Fig. 8: Picnic, Canadian style. On reconnaissance at Trail Valley Creek,  
Northwest Territories, Canada; August 2012. (photo credit: Philip Wookey)
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Fig. 9: RRS James Clark Ross in sea ice (photo credit: British Antarctic Survey)
Greenhouse gas predictions
The NERC ARP has much improved our understanding of how 
the processes producing greenhouse gases in the Arctic are 
changing in response to warming, increases in rainfall, and the 
northward spread of shrubs and trees. NERC ARP results and 
other recent research suggest increasing self-reinforcing 
warming in the Arctic (see previous section).
However, large uncertainties exist in our capability to predict 
not only in time, but also spatially. Arctic data are sparse and 
balancing greenhouse gas fluxes across landscapes requires 
extrapolation. Therefore, models that work on simple 
principles that can be measured remotely (e.g. via satellites) are 
ideal. Encouragingly, researchers found that most of the 
variation in ecosystem productivity (i.e. potential CO2 uptake), 
regardless of vegetation cover type, could be predicted using 
simple and available measures such as light available to plants, 
air temperature and the way vegetation reflects radiation. This 
means that rough predictions of productivity can be made 
despite spatial variation in vegetation24. However, microbial 
processes in soils cannot be measured remotely, which leaves 
a gap in estimating net greenhouse gas fluxes.
Technical improvements have also been made in using 
available data. Methane fluxes estimated by satellite data 
appear promising based on comparisons with empirical 
measurements. Thus, greenhouse gas estimates for remote 
and inaccessible areas could improve in the near future. 
Further, improvements in models have enabled identification 
of the sources of methane-rich air masses. For example, some 
high values measured over the sea between mainland Norway 
and Svalbard were traced to originate not from the sea, but 
from wetlands in Russia25. Tracing sources of methane will be 
invaluable in improving greenhouse gas source maps as well 
as predicting future emission hotspots.
Sea ice predictions
Researchers compared the predictions of sea ice cover made 
by different computer models to determine what factors 
influence the accuracy of predictions. No model can produce 
completely accurate predictions because of the underlying 
chaotic nature of the climate system, but the researchers 
concluded that improvements in the models are still possible, 
although there are some challenges to be addressed26.
Models do not run completely independently of observations. 
They need data from observations to be incorporated to 
provide their starting conditions. Newer models also 
incorporate observations to improve accuracy as they run. For 
accurate predictions to be made of sea ice cover some 
months ahead, the researchers found that it was most 
important to have good observations of sea ice thickness. 
These come from satellite measurements, but there is a 
technical challenge involved in making these as accurate as 
possible because the satellites’ sensors are confused by pools 
of water forming on the surface of the ice floes as they begin 
to melt. Further work will be required to address this challenge.
The predictions of Arctic sea ice cover that underpin global 
climate models encompass the entire area of the Arctic Ocean. 
Less effort has hitherto been put into developing models 
which can produce the detailed regional forecasts that will be 
of most use for commercial purposes. NERC ARP researchers 
have found that predicting sea ice is most difficult in areas 
closest to the coast, which is where the forecasts are likely to 
be of most value27. This is another area where further work to 
improve model predictions is likely to be fruitful.
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Question 4: Are the risks of natural hazards in the Arctic region 
increasing as a result of regional warming and what are the 
threats posed to the UK?
Key points:
•  Sea-level rise in the Arctic has two major consequences: 
coastal erosion and rising water tables. This might 
exacerbate some of the positive climate feedbacks 
identified by NERC ARP scientists, i.e. through methane 
emissions. Rising sea levels combined with longer ice-free 
seasons and increased storminess are also threatening local 
communities.
•  Submarine landslides have occurred more frequently than 
previously thought and they are now likely to be included in 
the UK National Risk Register. However, they are unlikely to 
be triggered by collapse of methane hydrates. Instead, risk 
appears most likely associated with the speed and amount of 
sediment accumulating on the seabed at particular locations.
•  The risk of offshore fossil fuel drilling acting as a trigger for 
submarine landslides is poorly researched and currently unknown.
Sea-level rise
Sea-level rise has two major effects on land masses. First, coastal 
erosion may increase as wave fronts hit higher on the coastline. 
The effects are already being felt, as sea-level rise combined with 
longer ice-off seasons and increasing storminess are threatening 
coastal communities28,29. Secondly, sea-level rise may exacerbate 
some of the positive climate feedbacks identified by NERC ARP 
scientists. Methane emissions are projected to rise in areas 
becoming wetter due to climate change, in particular lowlands, 
many of which border coastlines, which will experience rising 
water tables. Furthermore, some of the water may become 
saline, with unknown consequences on the biogeochemistry 
and therefore greenhouse gas emissions of these areas.
Under-sea landslides and tsunamis
The highest uncertainties in current understanding of under-sea 
(submarine) landslides relates to the frequency at which catastrophic, 
societally damaging landslide-triggered tsunamis occur and the 
role that methane hydrates play in triggering landslides. The latter 
process especially has been hotly debated as there is a possibility 
that hydrates will collapse in response to ocean warming (see 
above). This could result in potentially catastrophic tsunamis. 
Such tsunamis have historically occurred most frequently in 
latitudes at or below the Subarctic. One of the largest known 
to date originated ca 8000 years ago at Storegga (65°N, 4°E) in 
the Norwegian Sea, an area studied by NERC ARP scientists.
The researchers discovered that landslides have occurred more 
frequently than previously thought, qualifying them for inclusion 
in the UK’s National Risk Register (< 100,000yr) as a potential 
tsunami risk. For example, a more recent and severe landslide at 
the Storegga site was discovered during field sampling, highlighting 
the importance of developing recurrence intervals/risks of landslides 
at particular locations. Whether and how to designate landslide-
related tsunamis as a formal risk is currently under discussion.
Evidence does not support the idea that methane hydrates cause 
landslides. Instead, risk appears most likely associated with the 
speed and amount of sediment accumulating on the seabed at 
particular locations.
Risks to offshore gas and oil extraction 
As there is only weak evidence for landslides being caused by 
methane hydrates, locations of methane hydrates may not 
reliably highlight hotspots for future landslide events. However, 
the risk of methane hydrate collapse with rising sea 
temperatures cannot be discounted. It should be considered 
in the planning of Arctic gas and oil extraction.
 
Fig. 10: Sea-floor view (looking south) of the Storegga Slide area (blue/green 
colours). The slide affected several hundred km of the Norwegian continental 
shelf about 8000 years ago. Image: Christian Berndt, GEOMAR.  
URL: http://www.geomar.de/en/news/article/meeresboden-in-bewegung-ge-
faehrdete-kuesten/
Implications for policy and decision makers from the NERC Arctic Research Programme 2011-16
13
Implications for future UK policy
The Government compiled an up-to-date Climate Change Risk 
Assessment in 201630. It highlighted several changes occurring 
at alarming speed globally and in the Arctic. For example, 
fourteen of the sixteen warmest years on record have 
occurred since 2000, with 2015 confirmed as the warmest 
year recorded globally30. Further, new observations show faster 
polar ice loss than reported in recent IPCC assessments30,31.
Specifically in the Arctic, sea ice extent has reduced significantly 
over the last few decades (Fig. 3), at a minimum being 49% below 
the 1979 – 2000 average30. The NERC ARP identified multiple 
self-reinforcing climate change feedbacks which increase the 
risk of accelerating climate change in the region and globally. 
Below, we summarise the main policy implications arising from 
the NERC ARP research, ranging from climate change policy 
to opportunities for increasing engagement between researchers 
and Government.
Arctic-linked climate change policy
The current UK Arctic policy framework states that the UK is a 
“global leader” as regards both pushing for reduced emissions 
of greenhouse gases and tackling the rapid changes facing the 
Arctic32. Self-reinforcing climate change in the Arctic that has 
global effects (e.g. sea-level rise, increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations, impacts on mid-latitude weather) is extremely 
likely. This report supports retaining current policy towards the 
Arctic, investing in both research and in concrete efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and advocating the global 
importance of the Arctic environment. The possibility of increasing 
frequency of weather extremes in coming years and decades 
has implications for UK Government policy across many areas, 
including health, water, food, energy security and transport. Key 
Government Departments with an interest include the FCO, 
Cabinet Office (Civil Contingencies Secretariat), DEFRA, Department 
of Health, BEIS and Department for Transport, amongst others.
Investment in future Arctic research
NERC ARP Principal Investigators were credited advisors on the 
Lloyd’s of London & Chatham House report “Arctic Opening: 
Opportunity and Risk in the High North” published in 201233. In 
the report’s Foreword, the CEO of Lloyd’s, Martin Ward, notes 
that “the pace of environmental transformation currently taking 
place in the Arctic is unprecedented”. The opportunities concern 
business sectors such as energy and mineral extraction, shipping, 
fisheries and tourism. But Ward observes that the level of 
uncertainty about the environmental and economic future of 
the Arctic is significant and he states that “there is a clear need 
for sustained investment in Arctic research”.
A strong theme echoed by many scientists is the need for 
internationalisation: cooperation among national funding agencies, 
provision of support of international collaborative efforts where 
the science is needed. On land, this is particularly the case for 
Russia, which administers large portions of the Arctic and 
sub-Arctic landmass and for which there is a striking paucity of 
data. The advent of stronger UK-Russia scientific relations in 2017 
is a promising development and should be capitalised upon.
Another strong theme raised by scientists is the need for regular 
monitoring of the Arctic. Monitoring programmes often fall 
foul of the short-term science funding cycle, but they have a 
critical function in tracking change. The UK is active in the 
European Space Agency and UK institutions have expertise in 
satellite-based remote-sensing. Two projects used satellite-
derived data for remote assessments of properties of the Arctic 
land surface. Promotion of space-based observation is a key 
route to overcoming the inaccessibility of the Arctic region.
People live in the Arctic and their lifeways are changing due to 
the changes occurring in the environment. As was reiterated at 
the last Arctic Science Summit, local populations must have a 
voice in research and their needs must be factored into Arctic 
policy decisions. While the UK does not have jurisdiction over 
communities in the Arctic, its science and policy nevertheless 
affect those populations. Cross-disciplinary work that involves 
social science approaches is needed to place observed 
changes and future projections in a human context. So far, this 
context has been lacking from the Arctic programme, as it 
remains discipline-specific.
Biodiversity, ecology and human subsistence
The UK Government’s 2013 Arctic policy report emphasised 
biodiversity changes as a key issue in Arctic policy. The majority 
of projects in the NERC ARP were physical and did not specifically 
address biodiversity or subsistence issues. However, several 
land-based projects contributed new knowledge about how 
changes in the landscape, primarily driven by the loss of permafrost, 
drive changes in vegetation cover and degree of waterlogging, etc.
Thawing permafrost alters landscape drainage and wetness, in 
turn affecting the navigation of the Arctic landscape by humans 
and animals. This in turn affects the distribution and health of 
animal species and thus the lives of subsistence herders and 
hunters. Changing weather patterns also affect animals. For 
example, mass starvation and death of deer has occurred in 
areas where climate change has resulted in late autumn rains. 
Once the rain freezes, it forms a layer that the animals cannot 
break to access food34.
The Arctic contains a vast number of fresh-water bodies: rivers, 
lakes and ponds. Their physical properties, such as length of the 
season of solid ice cover, are changing and affecting human and 
animal movements. Changing vegetation cover (“greening”) affects 
nutrient loads in rivers and lakes, which in turn is likely to alter the 
ecology and biodiversity of aquatic systems, which are critical 
to the ecology of numerous migratory bird species and locally 
important sources of fish for human populations. We can expect 
major changes in biodiversity and ecosystem function in Arctic 
lakes and waterways that may be as great as the changes 
associated with planetary warming at the end of the last ice age.
The rapidly changing Arctic environment
14
Opportunities for engagement between 
Government and researchers
Science diplomacy
The undertaking of Arctic research and subsequent use of the 
results obtained underpins the UK’s policy engagement in the 
Arctic and contributes directly to its good relations with Arctic 
States. As an Observer to the Arctic Council, the UK’s 
contribution to the sustainable development and 
environmental management of the Arctic is largely based on 
scientific cooperation with Arctic States and the wider Arctic 
science community.
Beyond providing a better understanding of the rapid changes 
in the Arctic, science can support the building of bridges and 
networks of collaborations to underpin the diplomatic relations 
between the UK and the Arctic states. Scientific research and 
collaborations are strongly interwoven with sustainable 
development and political stability in the Arctic. Supporting the 
one will generally lead to strengthening the other.
Reciprocally, diplomacy can facilitate international scientific 
cooperation. It is therefore crucial for the quality of UK Arctic 
science that the UK continues to support international science 
cooperation and multilateral large-scale research 
infrastructures in the Arctic, for example through active 
membership of, and engagement with, IASC (the International 
Arctic Science Committee).
Making Government data accessible for science
The Arctic is a difficult environment in which to gather data 
because access is limited both by sea ice and complex terrain 
and because satellite coverage is currently limited. Due to 
these limitations, researchers lack observational data to 
calibrate and validate models, especially predictive models, 
such as sea ice and climate cycle predictions. As the accuracy 
of model predictions is currently limited by data availability 
more than by computing power, more data are needed if 
models are to realise their potential to make reliable 
predictions. 
The UK Government can play a crucial role, not only through 
funding for further research and data collection, but through 
an increased effort to facilitate access to existing data both in 
the UK and internationally through collaboration with Arctic 
States. Declassifying data, such as in the SEATS project that 
analyses Ministry of Defence submarine data, is an excellent 
example of successful use of government-held data (Box 6). 
More should be done to allow access for scientists to 
measurements held by the UK Government and its agencies.
Beyond making data accessible, more attention should be 
given to “data rescue”. For example, large amounts of historical 
data, such as ship data, are held in the National Archives. 
Gaining access to extensive historical data sources presents a 
significant challenge, as the records are all still in paper form 
and would need to be digitised to be of use. In addition to 
making full use of existing data sources, relatively limited sums 
of funding allocated to data rescue projects can bear 
significant benefits, both in terms of cost-effectiveness and 
scientific value.
BOX 6: Using submarine data for science
In areas of thick multi-year sea ice cover, the ice acts as a barrier between the atmosphere and the ocean, stopping energy 
from wind from being transferred to the sea and generate waves. As the ice pack shrinks and begins to break up, this 
protective barrier is being lost and more sea is exposed to wind, which produces turbulence in the water, mixing it up.
Little has been known previously about the effect of sea ice loss on wind-generated mixing, and how this is likely to affect 
ocean circulation. Few observations have been available, because of the difficulties of surveying by ship in ice-covered areas.
Researchers involved in the SEATS project were given access to data gathered by instruments aboard a Royal Navy 
submarine, so that they could compare ocean mixing in ice-covered areas with that in areas free from ice7. The 
understanding they have gained will enable scientists to better represent wind-driven mixing in models and so allow more 
accurate predictions of future climate.
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Facilitating contacts with users of science
Connecting the worlds of academia and politics is an ongoing 
challenge that also affects the world of Arctic science and policy. 
Although many forums exist in the UK and abroad to increase 
collaboration both among Arctic scientists and Arctic policymakers, 
and between these two groups, many researchers are still unsure 
about how to engage with decision-makers. Bridging the gap 
between Arctic science and policy requires a balancing act on 
both sides. Policymakers are required to balance evidence 
provided by Arctic scientists against other, potentially conflicting, 
interests, while scientists have to balance scientific accuracy with 
the requirement to simplify the science to make it accessible.
Notwithstanding the above, the Arctic offers a unique opportunity 
to increase knowledge exchange between scientists and 
policymakers, as science lies at the core of the UK’s Arctic 
strategy. This requires scientists to engage with non-academic 
audiences and discuss the implications of their findings for 
Arctic policy. This knowledge exchange should be facilitated 
through regular and long-term engagement between the policy 
and the scientific community. Research Councils, the NERC 
Arctic Office and international Arctic forums have a crucial role 
to play in facilitating this dialogue. This policy report is an 
example of a concrete initiative to engage with the Arctic policy 
community and discuss the Arctic climate research carried out 
in the NERC ARP. Similar initiatives, under the auspices of the 
Research Councils and the Government, could continue 
supporting the dialogue between Arctic science and policy.
The dialogue between Arctic scientists and policymakers also 
allows for capacity-building on both sides. Through repeated 
interaction and open discussion, scientists can develop greater 
understanding of the world of policy, while policymakers 
acquire the necessary scientific literacy to make sense of 
complex Arctic science, generating a positive feedback loop of 
greater understanding and interest for Arctic science. Science 
advice to Government could be provided at the highest level 
through a high-level policy guidance group, similarly to the EU 
high-level guidance panel.
Beyond knowledge exchange, sustained engagement over 
time may have positive effects on collaboration between 
scientists and policymakers. The contribution of scientific 
research to solving the most pressing policy challenges in the 
Arctic could be significant, if policymakers were to be involved 
in the definition of the research questions. Similarly, more 
could be done to engage with a diverse range of stakeholders 
jointly. Different communities: businesses, charities, NGOs, 
academia and policymakers discuss many Arctic policy-related 
issues bilaterally. However, the complexity of the Arctic 
requires fora to discuss issues across the worlds of NGOs, 
science, business and politics. The Government could play an 
essential role in facilitating such a multi-stakeholder forum on 
the Arctic.
 
Fig. 11: Collection of images showcasing UK Arctic involvement (photo credits: British Antarctic Survey, Cammell Laird, S. Andrews - University of York,  
National Oceanography Centre, European Space Agency)
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Appendix 1: List of projects reviewed
All projects are listed at http://arp.arctic.ac.uk/
Project Topic Area
ACCACIA Aerosols, clouds, climate change Svalbard (Norway)
APPOSITE Arctic climate prediction feasibility Pan-Arctic
Canadian Archipelago 
Oceanography
Ocean circulation, climate change Canada, Greenland
CYCLOPS Permafrost melting, carbon cycling Northwest Territories, Yukon Territory (Canada)
Eurasian Arctic Carbon cycling, climate change Eurasia
HYDRA Carbon cycling, greenhouse gas budgets Northwest Territories, Yukon Territory (Canada)
LAC Carbon cycling in lakes, climate change & vegetation 
change
Alaska, Greenland, Norway
Landslide-Tsunami Submarine landslide risks, climate change Norwegian Sea
MAMM Greenhouse gases European Arctic
Methane budget Methane release, oceans, terrestrial, climate change Pan-Arctic
Methane hydrates Methane release, oceans, climate change Svalbard (Norway)
SEATS Ice cover changes, ocean circulation, climate change Arctic Ocean
TEA-COSI Freshwater pulses, ocean circulation, climate change Arctic Ocean
Appendix 2: Further reading
Informative lay reviews and case studies of Arctic climate change causes, effects, and predictions include:
Web resources:
Methane emitted also in cold months: http://www.
climatechangenews.com/2016/01/06/Arctic-methane-
emissions-greater-than-previous-estimates/
Drying permafrost thaw areas release CO2 rapidly: https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/melting-tundra-releases-carbon-
dioxide-quickly/
Arrival of spring marks CO2 pulse in polygonal tundra: https://
phys.org/news/2016-12-scientists-pulse-CO2-emissions-Arctic.
html
Permafrost thaw in polygonal tundra results in drying and soil 
collapse: http://www.innovations-report.com/html/reports/
earth-sciences/a-glance-into-the-future-of-the-Arctic.html
Climate change induces vast erosion of coastlines and organic 
carbon: http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2017/01/06/
collapsing-Arctic-coastlines/
Permafrost thaw collapses land masses and exposes ancient 
soils: http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20170223-in-siberia-
there-is-a-huge-crater-and-it-is-getting-bigger
Basic descriptions of Arctic: http://www.terrapolaris.com/5/
Arctic/the-Arctic-in-general/arktische-landflaechen/
Basic information on greenhouse gases: https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions
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Assessment. (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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Assessment 2017 Synthesis report: priorities for the next five 
years. (Adaptation Sub-Committee, 2016).
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